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Do the Disposition and House Money Effects Coexist? 
A Reconciliation of Two Behavioral Biases using Individual 
Investor-Level Data 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses investor-level data to examine jointly the tendency of investors to succumb to 
the disposition effect and the house money effect; two behavioral biases premised on seemingly 
contradictory responses to prior gains/losses.  We document three novel findings.  First, the two 
effects can contemporaneously coexist in a single stock market and the majority of investors (53.5%) 
simultaneously succumb to both effects.  Second, we demonstrate the importance of distinguishing 
prior outcomes across two dimensions; unrealized/realized and stock/portfolio level.  Third, we find that 
the house money effect moderates the disposition effect, suggesting that cognitive biases need not 
always have negative consequences. 
 
Keywords: behavioral biases; disposition effect; gains and losses; house money effect; investor 
behavior; mental accounting; prior outcomes. 
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Do the Disposition and House Money Effects Coexist? A Reconciliation of Two Behavioral 
Biases using Individual Investor-Level Data 
1. Introduction 
Contrary to principles of rational economic behavior, prior outcomes have been shown to 
influence individuals’ decisions.  Shefrin and Statman (1985) coined the phrase the “disposition 
effect” to refer to the tendency of investors to sell winning shares while continuing to hold losing 
ones.  The disposition effect is a robust behavioral anomaly, with widespread evidence in a variety of 
financial markets; including the U.S. (Odean, 1998), Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), China 
(Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Chen et al. 2007), experimental markets (Weber and Camerer, 1998; 
Oehler et al.2003; Summers and Duxbury, 2012) and across a range of different trader types, 
including day traders (Jordan and Diltz, 2004) and professionally managed accounts (Shapira and 
Venezia, 2001).1  Such behavior has largely been explained in terms of the S-shape value function in 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which depicts risk aversion in the gain domain 
(winning shares) and risk seeking in the loss domain (losing shares).  Thaler and Johnson (1990), in 
contrast, coined the term house money effect to reflect evidence in the context of financial gambles 
that individuals tend to be more risk taking following prior gains (i.e. when gambling with the 
casino’s money rather than their own), while being more risk averse following prior losses.  While 
there are fewer studies of the house money effect (see Locke and Mann, 2003; for an early study) 
than the disposition effect, there is growing evidence of the presence of the former effect in 
financial markets; including Sweden (Massa and Simonov, 2005), Taiwan (Liu et al., 2010), Australia 
(Frino et al., 2008) and experimental markets (Gneezy et al., 2003; Ackert et al., 2006). 
On first consideration, the two effects seem at odds with one another, with the disposition effect 
                                                 
1 See Barber and Odean (2011) for a discussion of the range of evidence in relation to individual investors.   
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reflecting risk aversion following prior gains and risk seeking following prior losses, while the house 
money effect is premised on the reverse behavior of risk seeking/aversion following prior 
gains/losses.  The primary purpose of this paper is to test whether the disposition and house money 
effects contemporaneously coexist in a single financial market, whether single investors 
simultaneously exhibit behavior consistent with both effects and whether the two effects potentially 
interact with one another.  While separate studies document the existence of the two biases 
individually, the use of disparate datasets across studies, render them unable to comment, either 
individually or collectively, on the coexistence of the two biases or the extent to which they may be 
driven by investors’ differing reactions to realized and unrealized gains/losses at the stock or 
portfolio level.  Furthermore, the simultaneous examination of the disposition and house money 
effects reported here uniquely informs not only if and how such disparate behavior might coexist, 
but also allows potential interactions to be explored.   
Using investor-level account data from a brokerage in China,2 which records all the trading data, 
static position data, and personal information of each investor registered with the brokerage, we find 
that the disposition and house money effects coexist contemporaneously in a single financial market; 
nearly all investors in our sample (95.1%) are subject to one effect or the other, while the majority 
(53.5%) simultaneously succumb to both.  Our results show that it is important to distinguish 
between prior outcomes across two dimensions: whether they relate to unrealized or realized 
outcomes and whether they have been assessed at the individual stock level or the aggregate 
portfolio level.  We demonstrate that the disposition effect is related to prior unrealized outcomes at 
the individual stock level, while the house money effect is related to prior realized outcomes at the 
                                                 
2
 The Chinese stock market has been the subject of much academic interest in recent years, with studies examining 
the efficiency of the market (Fong, 2009), the profitability of trading strategies (Schuppli and Bohl, 2010) and the 
extent of integration with other international stock markets (Wang and Firth, 2004; Wang and Iorio, 2007; Li, 2013), 
along with a range of behavioral issues, including the disposition effect (Chen et al, 2007; Feng and Seasholes, 
2008). 
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individual stock level and to both prior unrealized and realized outcomes at the aggregate portfolio 
level.  This latter result extends the findings in other studies of the house money effect in financial 
markets (e.g. Liu et al., 2010; and Massa and Simonov, 2005), that show the effect is present in 
aggregate portfolio level data, to document the presence of the effect in individual stock level data.  
It seems that how investors mentally account for gains and losses is an important determinant of 
how they react to prior outcomes.   
We provide unique insight into a hitherto unrecognized interaction between the two effects, 
documenting the moderating impact of the house money effect on the disposition effect.  After 
controlling for a number of individual investor characteristics (age, gender, wealth, diversification 
and turnover), we find that those investors with a higher tendency to succumb to the house money 
effect have a lower tendency to display the disposition effect.  While the disposition effect may 
damage investors’ returns, with winning stocks sold earning on average a 3.92% higher return than 
losing stocks held, we find that the house money effect reduces the cost to investors succumbing to 
the tendency to sell winning stocks, but increases the cost to investors succumbing to the tendency 
to hold losing stocks.  The cost reduction for winning stocks, however, is over four times the cost 
increase for losing stocks, hence the analysis supports the view that the house money effect 
moderates the disposition effect and that the impact is of economic significance.  While cognitive 
biases have conventionally been viewed as detrimental to decision making, this latter finding 
suggests this need not always be the case, particularly when multiple cognitive biases may be at play. 
2. Evaluation of prior gains and losses: literature and hypotheses 
On first consideration, the disposition and house money effects seem at odds with one another, 
with the former reflecting risk aversion following prior gains and risk seeking following prior losses, 
while the latter is premised on the reverse behavior of risk seeking/aversion following prior 
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gains/losses.  Two important factors follow from Shefrin and Statman’s (1985) conceptualization of 
the disposition effect based on capital gain and loss realization.  First, the gains and losses that drive 
such behavior must be unrealized, because the decision is to sell or hold stocks already owned.  
Second, investors must evaluate, or mentally account, for such gains and losses at the level of the 
individual stock rather than their portfolio as a whole (narrow as opposed to broad framing in the 
terminology of Barberis and Huang, 2001).  In contrast, following Thaler and Johnson’s (1990) 
discussion of integration and segregation in the context of the house money effect, it is not clear 
whether such behavior need be premised on an evaluation of realized gains and losses at the 
individual stock or aggregate portfolio level  It is interesting to note that the existing evidence in 
support of the disposition effect in financial markets is based on a comparative analysis of decision-
making, focusing on sell and hold decisions for winning or losing stocks (e.g. Shefrin and Statman, 
1985; Odean, 1998; and Grinblatt and Han, 2005), while evidence to date in support of the house 
money effect is provided at the aggregate portfolio level (e.g. Liu et al., 2010; and Massa and 
Simonov, 2005).  In the following, we draw briefly on prior literature to motivate further our interest 
in the impact of individuals adopting a narrow or broad frame when evaluating their investments 
and the distinction between realized and unrealized prior outcomes, and to develop our hypotheses.   
Individuals have been shown to compartmentalize money into distinct mental accounts in their 
minds; with money posted in distinct accounts treated differently in terms of the propensity to 
spend and individuals reluctant to aggregate gains and losses across different accounts (Thaler, 
1999).  In the context of examining the impact of prior outcomes on trading behavior, evidence 
from the mental accounting literature suggests that decision makers can evaluate prior outcomes in a 
“narrow frame” or in a “broad frame” (Thaler, 1999). In the former the effect of prior outcomes for 
a given stock would only be observed in the relevant investment account for that stock, whereas in 
the latter the effect would spread to the whole portfolio and so impact upon other stocks held.  
 6 
Barberis and Huang (2001) propose that investors may use both “individual stock accounting” 
(narrow framing) and “portfolio accounting” (broad framing) when making decisions. Investors may 
make different decisions when adopting different “frames” and, therefore, disparate behavioral 
effects could be observed when we examine investors’ trading behavior from the different 
perspectives of “individual stock accounting” and “portfolio accounting”.  We consider whether the 
disposition effect and the house money effect are jointly or separately observed at the portfolio-level 
and/or the stock-level.  In doing so, we examine how behavior is influenced by prior outcomes in 
terms of “individual stock accounting” (narrow frame) and “portfolio accounting” (broad frame). 
It is conceivable that investors may bracket realized and unrealized outcomes into different 
mental accounts and hence treat them differently (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Moreover, anticipated 
regret theory would also imply that realized and unrealized prior outcomes may impact risk attitudes, 
and so behavior, in different ways (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Zeenlenberg, 1999).  Zeelenberg 
(1999) argues that anticipated regret plays an important role in an individual’s response to unrealized 
outcomes, an aspect acknowledged by Shefrin and Statman (1985) in the context of the disposition 
effect.  A tendency to sell winners rather than hold them might arise because investors anticipate the 
regret they would experience were they to continue to hold the winning stock only for it to 
subsequently fall in value, eroding all or part of the unrealized gain.  Selling, and hence realizing the 
gain, removes this possibility.  Summers and Duxbury (2012) demonstrate experimentally that 
emotions have a leading role to play in the disposition effect.  In their experiment they manipulate 
responsibility for prior gains and losses, which in turn manipulates the emotions to be experienced.  
Absent responsibility for the initial buy decision, prior gains/losses may lead to feelings of 
elation/disappointment at the outcome, while feelings of rejoicing/regret may also be experienced in 
the presence of responsibility.  Summers and Duxbury (2012) find that regret drives the tendency for 
investors to hold losers, while elation is sufficient to cause investors to sell winners (rejoicing is not 
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required).  In the absence of responsibility for the initial decision to buy the investment, they find no 
evidence of a disposition effect in the presence of prior gains and losses, providing direct support 
for recent theoretical (Barberis and Xiong, 2009) and empirical (Kaustia, 2010) challenges to the 
view that prospect theory provides a sole causal explanation of the disposition effect.  There is good 
reason to believe, therefore, that realized and unrealized outcomes might play different roles in 
investors’ decision making processes, hence we examine the extent to which prior realized and 
unrealized outcomes impact differentially on trading behavior.3   
In this paper we examine empirically whether the disposition and house money effects 
contemporaneously coexist in a single financial market, whether single investors simultaneously 
exhibit behavior consistent with both effects and whether the two effects potentially interact with 
one another.  While Massa and Simonov (2005) and Frino et al. (2008) investigate both the house 
money effect and loss aversion, which they see as synonymous with the disposition effect, they do 
not measure directly the effect as defined by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and as operationalized by 
Odean (1998), thus they are unable to fill the gap that this paper seeks to address.  There are other 
important features that distinguish our work from that of these two prior studies.  First, a primary 
concern of Massa and Simonov (2005) is to investigate how investors react to prior outcomes taking 
into account all wealth and income, not just financial wealth in the form of stock holdings, and they 
show that gains and losses in one category of wealth (e.g. real estate) can influence investors’ 
holdings in other wealth categories (e.g. financial assets).  In order to achieve this, Massa and 
Simonov (2005) assemble an impressive dataset combining data on individual stock holdings with 
data from a longitudinal panel survey of Swedish households, which includes details relating to 
wealth, real estate, labor and entrepreneurial income, amongst other things.  This survey data is 
                                                 
3 While this distinction has been largely ignored in the empirical finance literature, a few studies recognize its potential importance (for 
example, Locke and Mann, 2003; Frino et al., 2008).  Unfortunately Frino et al. (2008) do not maintain such a distinction when 
investigating the impact of loss aversion, which, given the findings in this paper, might account for their failure to find evidence in 
support of a disposition effect. 
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collected once a year, hence the analysis undertaken in Massa and Simonov (2005) is based on low 
frequency (yearly) data.  In contrast, we follow the convention in other studies (e.g. Barber and 
Odean, 2000; Odean, 1998) of using high frequency transaction data.  Second, Massa and Simonov 
(2005) use measures of realized financial net gains and losses declared by investors when they file 
with the authorities.  Setting aside the potential problems associated with self-reported measures, 
this approach limits Massa and Simonov (2005) to consider aggregate gains and losses and so 
prohibits them from undertaking detailed analyses at the individual stock level as is the case in our 
own work.  Third, similar to Coval and Shumway (2005), but based on Australian data, Frino et al. 
(2008) examine how morning gains or losses influence the afternoon risk taking behavior of futures 
traders, while we examine the effect of prior outcomes on trading behavior in relation to stocks 
using predominantly individual investors. 
In a recent study, Duxbury et al (2013) investigate how prior realized outcomes impact on the 
characteristics of stocks investors select to hold in their portfolios, hence they are concerned with an 
evaluation of the impact of realized outcomes at the portfolio-level on investors’ buy/hold decisions.  
Following positive prior realized outcomes, Duxbury et al (2013) find that investors are more prone 
to invest in stocks with characteristics broadly consistent with higher risk taking (for example, higher 
betas and higher levels of idiosyncratic risk) than is the case following prior negative realized 
outcomes, though the precise characteristics differ across investor classes.  In this study, we consider 
more widely the evaluation and impact of realized and unrealized outcomes at both the stock-level and 
portfolio-level on investors’ sell/hold decisions, with the latter focus driven by our interest in the 
disposition effect (i.e. the tendency to sell winners too soon and hold losers too long). 
Drawing on the discussion of the literature above, we develop below our hypotheses.  The first 
step in investigating the coexistence of the disposition effect and the house money effect is to 
demonstrate that the former effect is present in our data.  Thus, based on individual stock level 
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analysis and consistent with Odean (1998), we test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The percentage of gains realized (PGR) for all observations > the percentage of losses realized (PLR) 
for all observations. 
To investigate whether the house money effect is present for individual stocks, we examine the 
effect of prior realized gains and losses for individual stocks on the tendency for investors to realize 
subsequent gains (PGR) and losses (PLR) on the same stock (i.e. the conditional PGR and PLR).   
Higher PGR means that investors are more likely to sell winners, which can be interpreted as 
exhibiting a higher level of risk aversion in the sense that investors sell winning stocks to lock in the 
gains on such stocks.  Thus, if prior realized gains result in increased risk taking behavior, as per the 
house money effect, we would expect PGR to be lower than would be observed in the presence of 
prior realized losses (i.e. investors exhibit a greater tendency to let subsequent unrealized gains ride 
by continuing to hold winning stock following prior realized gains than prior realized losses).  
Conversely, a smaller PLR indicates a higher level of risk taking as losers are held longer.  Thus, if 
prior realized losses result in reduced risk taking behavior we would expect PLR to be higher than 
would be observed in the presence of prior realized gains (i.e. investors exhibit a greater tendency to 
cut their losses by selling losing stock following prior realized losses than prior realized gains).  
Hence we test hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
Hypothesis 2a: PGR for observations with prior realized gains (PGR-Gain) < PGR for observations with prior 
realized losses (PGR-Loss.)4 
Hypothesis 2b: PLR for observations with prior realized gains (PLR-Gain) < PLR for observations with prior 
realized losses (PLR-Loss). 
                                                 
4 PGR-Gain is the percentage of gains realized relative to all gains on which investors hold prior realized gains; and PGR-Loss is the 
percentage of gains realized relative to all gains on which investors hold prior realized losses.  PLR-Gain and PLR-Loss are the 
corresponding measures for the percentage of losses realized.  
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Implicit in the discussion of hypotheses 1 and 2 is the assumption that a higher propensity to sell 
a stock implies lower risk taking.  While this may be true by design in experimental studies in which 
there is only one risky asset and where sale implies a switch to a risk-free asset, it does not 
necessarily follow in stock markets where there are many risky asset alternatives and investors are 
free to reinvest the sale proceeds from one risky asset in other risky assets.  However, hypotheses 1 
and 2 relate to the individual stock level, a situation where Barberis and Huang (2001, p.1247-1248, 
emphasis in original) suggest “loss aversion and narrow framing play an important role in determining 
attitudes towards risk”.  If investors adopt a narrow frame (i.e. they mentally account from an 
individual stock level perspective), then their sell decisions are influenced, at least in part, by the 
desire to lock-in a sure gain by selling their winners or to avoid closing the account at a loss (Thaler, 
1999) by holding losers.  A decision to sell, therefore, may still be perceived as lower risk taking 
irrespective of what the investor subsequently chooses to do with the sale proceeds, be it reinvesting 
in another risky asset or holding some form of risk-free asset.   
We turn our attention now to consider aggregate “portfolio accounting” (broad framing).  When 
investigating investors’ risk attitudes at the aggregate portfolio level, prior outcomes cannot be 
related to narrow framing thus the potential influence of loss aversion and emotions on trading 
behavior, and the disposition effect in particular, become unclear.  In contrast, based on prior 
evidence in Massa and Simonov (2005) and Liu et al. (2010), we expect the house money effect to be 
observed at the aggregate portfolio level.  We extend these prior studies to examine the effect of 
both unrealized and realized prior outcomes on subsequent risk taking.   
Hypothesis 3: At the aggregate portfolio level, investors with unrealized and realized prior gains should have higher 
subsequent risk measures (i.e. expected absolute position change, relative trade size and CAPM beta) 
than those with unrealized and realized prior losses. 
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3. Data 
Our data set comprises two parts. The first part is a brokerage account data set from a brokerage 
located in Beijing, China, which includes all the trading data, static position data, and data on 
personal characteristics (such as investor age and gender) of the investors who are registered with 
the brokerage as clients. For each transaction of an investor, we have the transaction date, quote 
time, transaction time, trading volume, transaction price, stock code and trading label (purchase or 
sale). The position data gives the stock codes and share volumes in investors’ portfolios at the end 
of each trading day. Restrictions on the number of fund accounts an investor can have and the 
number of brokerages for which they can be clients, mean that the data provides full information 
about the trades, stock positions and portfolios of investors during the sample period.  The 
brokerage provides the transaction data and portfolio data5 for 3,139 individual and 49 institutional 
investors, though filtering to remove inactive accounts (i.e., those with no buys or sells) and those 
with zero holdings (i.e. zero portfolio value) reduces the number of individual investors in our 
sample to 2,528.  There are 314,932 transactions in our data set, including 140,839 sales, and the 
total trade value is RMB 10,089,722,910.  The second part of the data set comprises daily stock price 
and return data, including the daily opening price, closing price, highest price, lowest price, and 
adjusted return of each stock in the market. This data is collected from CCFR (China Centre for 
Financial Research, Tsinghua University) and the Yahoo Finance website.  The data sample period is 
from February 27, 2001 to December 16, 2004.  During this time the SHSE and the SZSE move 
closely together through three bull and three bear market cycles (Yan et al, 2007), thus supporting a 
joint analysis of the two exchanges.  We restrict our attention to A shares, because they dominate the 
Chinese stock market in terms of the number of companies listed, daily trading values and market 
                                                 
5 Similar to the findings in numerous prior studies (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2000), portfolio diversification in the sample is low (see 
Fuertes et al, 2012, for a discussion of behavioral factors influencing diversification).  The average number of stocks in the portfolios, 
measured on a monthly basis during the sample period, is 2.91 and 3.10 for individual and institutional investors, respectively, and 
they turn over their portfolio 1.01 and 2.12 times, respectively, per month. 
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capitalization6, and also because domestic trading in B shares is very thin. 
4. Empirical Method 
4.1 Methodology 
We measure realized and unrealized prior outcomes for a given investor on a given stock, which 
we also use to construct aggregate portfolio data.  We also capture investors’ trade decisions, employ 
proxies to capture risk attitudes, and construct measures of the disposition and house money effects.  
All of the above is done at the investor-level and we also capture various investor characteristics.  
4.1.1 Measuring prior outcomes 
For each investor, at the end of each trading day we compute 
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where i denotes investor i, t denotes trading day t, n denotes the nth stock, K indicates the investor 
has made K trades over this stock in a period, k is the kth trade of the K trades over the stock, R nti ,,
and  U nti ,, are realized and unrealized outcomes respectively, 
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7 of the kth trade, Reference,, ntiP  is the current 
reference price indicating the costs at which the investor purchases the stock currently in his 
portfolio, Sell,, kniV  is the selling volume of the kth trade, and 
Hold
,, ntiV  is the volume that the investor 
                                                 
6 By the end of 2001, there were over 1,100 companies listed with A shares while there were only 110 companies listed with B shares. 
The market capitalization of the A share stock market was RMB 4224.6 billion and that of the B share stock market was RMB 127.7 
billion. 
7 The choice of method used to determine reference prices will impact on the value of the prior outcomes computed.  We employ 
three different methods; share-weighted value of all the historical purchasing prices, “FIFO” (First-In-First-Out) and “LIFO” (Last-
In-First-Out).  The analyses and results are robust to the method chosen, hence we only report the results derived using the share-
weighted reference price. 
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holds in his portfolio.  Note that the prior outcome at the aggregate portfolio level for a given 
investor on a given trading day is simply the sum of outcomes on all the stocks in their portfolio, 
computed separately for realized and unrealized outcomes.  
Our approach to distinguishing between unrealized and realized outcomes is related to, but 
differs from, Barberis and Xiong’s (2009) examination of the prospect theory explanation of the 
disposition effect from the perspective of annual gains/losses and realized gains/losses.  In the 
former case investors receive utility from prior gains/losses only at the end of the year, while in the 
latter case they receive “a jolt of prospect theory utility right then, at the moment of sale, where the 
utility term depends on the size of the realized gain or loss” (Barberis and Xiong, 2009, p. 753).  
Thus, their distinction is not driven by whether a sale has taken place, but rather by when the utility 
from a sale is derived.  In contrast, we use unrealized to refer to paper gains/losses prior to a sale 
being initiated, while realized gains/losses derive only after a sale takes place.8   
4.1.2 Prior outcomes and decision making at the individual stock level 
To measure the tendency of an investor to sell or hold a stock at the individual stock level, we 
employ the method of Odean (1998).  Each day that an investor sells a stock, we compute PGR 
(Percentage of Gains Realized to all gains) and PLR (Percentage of Losses Realized to all losses).  
1.  
gainspaperofNumbergainsrealizedofNumber
gainsrealizedofNumber
PGR

  (3) 
1.  
lossespaperofNumberlossesrealizedofNumber
lossesrealizedofNumber
PLR

  (4) 
A sale is judged to be a gain (loss) by comparing the selling price to the reference price. 9 For 
                                                 
8 Barberis and Xiong (2009) compute gains and losses relative to the return on the risk free rate.  In line with many prior empirical 
studies (e.g. Odean, 1998), we compute gains and losses relative to the reference purchase price, excluding adjustments for the risk 
free return. 
9 We define a sale as a realized gain/loss if an investor sells any (positive) proportion of his/her holding of a particular stock. 
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stocks not sold in a given day, if both the lowest and highest price are above (below) its reference 
price it is counted as a paper gain (loss), otherwise it is classed as neither a gain nor a loss.  Since the 
intention is to compare the PGR and PLR ratios across stocks with prior realized gains or losses, we 
group stocks by their prior realized outcomes first and calculate the conditional PGR and PLR.  On 
those days when no sales take place for a given investor, no gains or losses are counted.   
4.1.3 Prior outcomes and risk attitudes at the aggregate portfolio level 
To investigate the relationship between prior outcomes at the aggregate portfolio-level it is not 
sufficient look at the buy/sell decisions on individual stocks, instead it is necessary to construct 
proxies for subsequent risk attitude.  To this end we measure the prior unrealized and realized 
outcomes at the end of each month that the investor holds a position and the risk taken in the 
following three months.  To measure the subjective risk attitude of each investor using the 
transaction data we adopt the approach of Coval and Shumway (2005), employing the expected 
absolute position change and the relative trade size as alternative proxies, to which we add the beta 
of the portfolio as derived by the CAPM model to capture systematic risk.10  We define an investor’s 
prior outcomes and subsequent risks at the beginning of a given month as an observation. There are 
a total of 15,406 observations, and for each observation the prior unrealized outcomes, realized 
outcomes, wealth of the corresponding investor, and subsequent risks are calculated.11   
Expected absolute position change, Relative trade size and CAPM beta 
We apply Coval and Shumway’s (2005) expected absolute position change measure of the 
subjective risk attitude of a trader.  For each stock on each trading day, the expected absolute price 
change is estimated by an ordered logit regression on the absolute price change on each trading day 
                                                 
10 For the whole sample, the correlation coefficients between relative trade size, expected absolute position change and CAPM beta 
are statistically insignificant, hence we conduct our analyses using all three proxies for risk attitude. 
11 For the relative trade size proxy the number of observations is slightly smaller than 15,406, because there is no value for this 
measure if the investor makes no trades in the three months following the prior outcome. 
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in the preceding five trading days and day-of-week dummy variables.  On a specific trading day, the 
expected absolute position change of an investor is the sum of the weighted (shares of stock) 
product of the expected absolute price change of each stock in the investor’s portfolio multiplied by 
the number of shares of the corresponding stock. Our risk measurement is the cumulative expected 
absolute position change in the three months after the observation date.12   
As per Coval and Shumway (2005) the relative size of each trade for a given investor is 
calculated as the average trade size in the three months after the observation date divided by the 
average trade size of this investor during the entire sample period.  
We also measure the risk that investors take when they trade by examining their post-trade 
portfolio structure. After each transaction, the investor reconstructs his/her portfolio and the risk of 
the portfolio changes. For each investor, we use portfolio beta estimated by the CAPM model for 
the three months after the observation date to proxy the risk of portfolio.  
4.1.4 Measures of the disposition and house money effects for each investor 
For each investor, we compute disposition effect and house money effect measures to identify 
whether an investor displays one or both of the behavioral biases.  Our purpose is to investigate 
investors’ reactions to prior outcomes, both realized and unrealized, thus we must be sure that 
investors have actually observed the prior gains and losses on stocks held in their portfolios 
(specifically, that they have observed the current stock price and so are cognizant of a gain or loss 
being present).  To ensure this is the case we adopt Odean’s (1998) PGR-PLR methodology, which 
examines investors’ portfolios only on those days when investors make a sale.13  Following Dhar and 
                                                 
12 While the summation implicitly assumes that risk increases linearly with time, the intention is to undertake a cross-sectional 
comparison across individuals’ risk attitudes for the same three month duration, not to compare an individual’s risk attitude over 
varying time intervals. 
13 While survival analysis has the benefit of using the additional information available on days where a sale does not take place (see 
Feng and Seasholes, 2005), we have no way of knowing in our dataset whether investors are cognizant of the unrealized gains or 
losses on their stocks on such days.   
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Zhu (2006) we measure the disposition effect at the level of the investor, rather than in aggregate.  
For investor i, the measure of the disposition effect ( iDPE ) is the discrepancy between the PGR 
and PLR during the whole sample period. A positive iDPE  indicates that an investor is more likely 
to realize gains than to realize losses. The higher the value of the DPE measure, the higher the 
tendency for the investor to exhibit the disposition effect.14 
We construct a measure of the house money effect for the whole sample period that is analogous 
to the disposition effect measure above. 
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Where, for investor i, iHME  is the house money effect measure, niPRO ,  is the prior realized 
outcomes in month n, 1, niRisk  is the risk measure
15 in month n+1, iRisk  is the average monthly 
risk measure (calculated as the monthly risk measure divided by the aggregate average monthly risk 
measure), and N is the total number of months in the period. A positive iHME  measure indicates 
that an investor is prone to the house money effect in the sense that they tend to be more risk taking 
after prior realized gains than losses.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Coexistence of the disposition and house money effects at the individual stock level? 
Table 1 reports the number of prior realized and unrealized gains and losses, along with PGR 
and PLR. Consistent with Odean (1998), we find PGR=0.2825 is significantly higher than 
                                                 
14 We recognize that there may be potential issues when using the PGR-PLR methodology in cross-sectional analyses of individual 
investor behavior (see, for example, Appendix D of Feng and Seasholes, 2005) and we employ controls and robustness checks to 
mitigate against such problems.   
15 Throughout we adopt the expected absolute change of the portfolio value as the risk measure. 
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PLR=0.1215, confirming the existence of the disposition effect in our data set (hypothesis 1).  When 
confronted with unrealized gains investors exhibit a greater tendency to realize those gains than their 
tendency, when confronted with unrealized losses, to realize those losses.  Next we extend the 
analysis to investigate the impact of prior realized gains and losses for a given stock on the tendency 
to make a subsequent decision to sell the stock (i.e. the conditional PGR and PLR).16  In the 
presence of prior realized gains, the proportion of gains realized (PGR-Gain = 0.3011) is greater 
than the proportion of losses realized (PLR-Gain = 0.1547), while in the presence of prior realized 
losses, the proportion of gains realized (PGR-Loss = 0.3389) is greater than the proportion of losses 
realized (PLR-Loss = 0.1659).  The differences are statistically significant and confirm the presence 
of the disposition effect (comparison across rows in Table 1) at the individual stock level both when 
investors hold prior realized gains or prior realized losses for the stock in question.  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
We examine whether behavior consistent with the house money effect is observed by comparing 
PGR (PLR) in the presence of prior realized gains to the PGR (PLR) in the presence of prior realized 
losses (comparison across columns in Table 1).  Consistent with the house money effect we expect 
investors to be more likely to continue to hold stocks (exhibit risk seeking behavior), whether they 
be currently winners or losers, for which they have a prior realized gain (i.e. both PGR-G and PLR-G) 
than stocks for which they have a prior realized loss (i.e. both PGR-L and PLR-L) which they are more 
likely to sell (exhibit risk avoiding behavior).  Table 1 reports that PGR-Loss (0.3389) is indeed 
higher than PGR-Gain (0.3011), while PLR-Loss (0.1659) is higher than PLR-Gain (0.1547), both at 
a statistically significant levels.  Thus, in support of hypotheses 2a and 2b, the results provides strong 
evidence of trading behavior consistent with the house money effect, with investors being more risk 
                                                 
16 To make clear, prior refers to a previous point in time, such that a prior realized gain at time0 requires the situation where an investor 
has experienced an unrealized gain at some point in the past (say time-2) that they decided subsequently to realize at a point in time 
preceding (say time-1) their current decision point (i.e. time0). 
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taking following prior realized gains than losses, based on individual stock-level data. 
By way of robustness test, we examine investors’ trading decisions using a binary logit approach, 
similar to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001).  On each day an investor trades, the dependent variable in 
the model equals 1 for a sale (whole or partial holding) and 0 otherwise. The primary regressors of 
interest are the prior unrealized and realized outcomes (gains/losses) on a given stock.  Following 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), we include control variables to capture the effects of other factors 
that may influence investors’ trading decisions (including past returns, market returns and investor 
characteristics).17  The results, not reported here, confirm the robustness of the above findings.  
Consistent with the disposition effect, prior unrealized outcomes are generally positively related to the 
tendency to sell, with investors more likely to sell stocks with prior unrealized gains than losses.  In 
contrast, consistent with the house money effect, prior realized outcomes are negatively related to the 
tendency to sell, with investors more likely to hold stocks with prior realized gains than losses. 18   
In summary, our stock level analysis reveals two important findings.  First, investors in the same 
stock market can contemporaneously display behavior consistent with the disposition and house 
money effects.  Second, the evidence indicates that whether prior outcomes are realized or 
unrealized is the key requirement for the presence of each effect.  The disposition effect is observed 
when investors’ decisions are investigated in relation to unrealized outcomes; specifically the 
proportion of those unrealized outcomes that they decide to realize.  In contrast, the house money 
effect is observed when investors’ decisions are investigated in the presence of prior realized 
outcomes, which impact upon their decision concerning the proportion of current unrealized outcomes 
that they decide to realize.  While it might seem that our results are at odds with recent theoretical 
                                                 
17 The control variables include past market-adjusted stock returns (computed over various time intervals), past market returns 
(computed over the same time intervals), along with variables to control for the potential asymmetric impact of investor 
characteristics (e.g. age, gender, diversification and turnover) following positive and negative prior unrealized and realized outcomes.  
While some control variables were significant, they are not discussed further here.  
18 Following, among others, Duxbury et al (2013), we separate investors into institutions, high, medium and low wealth individual 
investors.  We find a positive relationship between prior realized outcomes and the tendency to sell for all but high wealth individuals. 
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work by Barberis and Xiong (2009) on the cause of the disposition effect, this is not the case.  We 
distinguish between unrealized gains/losses prior to the initiation of a sale and realized gains/losses 
deriving from a past sale, while their concern is with the realization of utility derived from prior gains 
and losses during the year, which occurs either at the end of the year or at the point of sale.   
5.2 Coexistence of the disposition and house money effects at the aggregate portfolio level? 
Next we turn to an investigation of trading behavior at the portfolio level, by examining the link 
between investors’ prior outcomes at the beginning of each month and their subsequent risk 
attitudes in the following three months.  The results from the three alternative measures of 
subsequent risk attitude are reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4. In all tables, observations of monthly 
investment outcomes and subsequent risks are double sorted by the wealth of the investor (i.e. the 
average portfolio position value, computed as the average of the values of the monthly portfolios for 
that investor) and the relative prior realized (Panel A) or unrealized (Panel B) outcomes (where relative 
prior outcomes are the rates of prior outcomes compared to the portfolio position values).  
Beginning with prior realized outcomes, there is strong evidence to suggest that these have an 
influence on the subsequent risk attitudes, with investors willing to take more risk following higher 
prior realized outcomes then lower ones (supported by the significant main effects in the two-way 
ANOVA tests for all three risk attitude measures).  The impact is particularly strong for the 
expected absolute position change measure (see Table 2 Panel A), where those investors with higher 
prior realized outcomes subsequently take higher risks (see significant t-test of differences for all 
wealth quintiles).  Although the individual wealth quintile results are not so clear-cut for the relative 
trade size (Table 3 Panel A) and portfolio CAPM beta (Table 4 Panel A) risk measures, for which 
only the low wealth groups (Quintiles 1 and/or 2) produce significant effects, the main effect of 
prior realized outcomes in the ANOVA model is significant for both these measures.  Turning to 
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prior unrealized outcomes, the results are again strongest for the expected absolute position change 
measure.  In Panel B of Table 2, the column t-statistics of differences in the risk attitude measure 
due to prior unrealized outcomes are highly significant and positive for all wealth quintiles, showing 
investors also tend to be more risk taking with higher prior unrealized outcomes. The results for the 
relative trade size measure in Panel B of Table 3 are similar, though they are not significant for 
Quintile 4.  In contrast, however, in Panel B of Table 4, the effect is not significant for any of the 
wealth quintiles when risk is measured as the portfolio CAPM beta. 
<Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here> 
There is evidence in Tables 2-4 of investors’ risk attitudes differing across wealth levels.  For 
example, the significant interaction effects in the two-way ANOVA models of Tables 2 and 3, 
suggest that the impact of prior outcomes on the risk attitude measures is affected by the level of 
wealth, such that higher wealth levels report lower effects of prior outcomes on the risk attitudes.  
To ensure our results relating prior outcomes to subsequent risk attitudes and behavioral biases are 
robust to disparate investor characteristics such as wealth, we examine the relationship between the 
change in prior outcomes and change in risk attitudes for each investor, thus eliminating the effect 
of factors such as wealth, experience, and other investor characteristics.  We select those 
observations where an investor holds positions in the current and the previous month, thus allowing 
us to compute the changes in prior unrealized and realized outcomes for each two consecutive 
month period.19  Next the selected observations are double sorted by the sign of the change of prior 
unrealized and realized outcomes, resulting in 2x2 groups based on positive/negative change and 
realized/unrealized.  Table 5 reports how risk taking varies with the changes in prior unrealized and 
realized outcomes. On average, investors change their risk attitudes following a change in their prior 
                                                 
19 This is to guarantee that for a given observation an investor has both prior unrealized and realized outcomes in two consecutive 
months. 
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outcomes.  When the prior unrealized and realized outcomes of the current month are both higher 
than the previous month (i.e. change >0 for both), all three of the risk measures support 
significantly increased risk taking.  When the prior unrealized and realized outcomes are both lower 
than the preceding month (i.e. change <0 for both), expected absolute position change and relative 
trade size measures support significantly reduced risk taking, while the CAPM beta measure is 
insignificant.  Jointly, the results confirm the existence of the house money effect for both prior 
unrealized and realized outcomes at the aggregate portfolio level.   
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
To conclude, based on the evidence presented in Tables 2 to 5, the house money effect is 
present at the portfolio level for both prior unrealized and realized outcomes (hypothesis 3), while the 
disposition effect is not observed.  After higher prior portfolio outcomes (including both unrealized 
and realized ones), investors tend to be more risk taking with their trades and portfolios than after 
lower prior portfolio outcomes.  We demonstrate, therefore, that the unit of analysis, whether it be 
the individual stock or the portfolio, is key to observing the disposition effect or the house money 
effect.  The former is only present in the case of individual stocks, while the latter is present for 
either individual stocks or portfolios of stocks. 
5.3 Relationship between the disposition and house money effects 
Having documented the contemporaneous co-existence of the disposition and house money 
effects in a single financial market, we turn our attention to an investigation of whether investors 
who are subject to one bias may also be subject to the other bias.  For a given investor, for both the 
disposition effect and the house money effect measures, a value >0 indicates that they succumb to 
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the corresponding bias and a value ≤0 indicates they do not.20  In Table 6 we categorize investors 
into four groups based on their scores on the two measures and report the number and proportion 
of investors in each category, along with the correlation coefficients between the behavioral biases.  
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 6, 87.6% of investors exhibit a disposition effect and 61% 
exhibit a house money effect, with both proportions significantly larger than the 50% expected by 
random chance. There are 95.1% of investors who are subject to at least one bias, while a 53.5% 
majority of the sample are subject to both biases simultaneously, with only 25% expected by random 
chance.  In Panel B of Table 6 we report the correlation coefficients between the two behavioral bias 
measures, the dummies of the two measures, and the two measures within each of four categories, 
separately. The dummy for each measure is defined as “1” when the value is >0 indicating that an 
investor is subject to the bias, and defined as “0” otherwise.  Based on the whole sample, 
correlations are insignificant. However, when we restrict our attention to those investors that 
succumb to both biases, the correlation between the disposition and house money effects is negative 
(-0.137) and highly significant, indicating that when an investor is subject to both effects 
contemporaneously, then a stronger disposition effect may be associated with a weaker house 
money effect, and vice versa.  One interpretation might be that, for a given investor, the presence of 
the house money effect weakens the magnitude of the disposition effect at the individual stock level.  
Indeed we see evidence of this in Table 2 where prior realized gains over an individual stock make 
investors more risk seeking than prior realized losses when making sell versus hold decisions on the 
stock (PGR-G = 0.3011 < PGR-L = 0.3389 and PLR-G = 0.1547 < PLR-L = 0.1659, both 
difference highly significant).  Overall the disposition effect measure in the presence of prior realized 
gains of 0.1464 is lower than that observed in the presence of prior realized losses of 0.1730.  There 
                                                 
20 In order to calculate the disposition effect measure investors must have realized at least one gain or loss during the period, while the 
house money effect measure requires that investors experience holding both positive and negative realized portfolio outcomes and 
that they continue to hold positions in the months following the prior realized outcomes.  Collectively these two requirements reduce 
the number of investors in the analysis to follow to 748.  However, as both measures are two-sided and thus permit behavior that is 
both consistent and inconsistent with the predicted behavior, the use of the reduced sample size is not expected to bias the analysis. 
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is evidence, therefore, that the house money effect moderates the disposition effect, such that 
increased risk taking behavior (in particular the decreased tendency to sell a winner) in the presence 
of prior gains may help to mitigate the extent of the disposition effect. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
5.4 Regression analysis 
To investigate the relationship between the disposition and house money effects further, we 
regress the disposition effect measure (dependent variable) against the house money effect measure 
(explanatory variable).  In light of empirical findings reported in the extant behavioral literature, we 
include a number of control variables to capture individual investor characteristics.21  We employ a 
range of proxies for investor sophistication, experience and learning, including a dummy variable to 
classify whether the investor is an institution or an individual, investors’ average monthly position 
values as a proxy measure of investors’ total wealth (which is unavailable in our data), the average 
number of different stocks held in an investor’s monthly portfolio as a measure of portfolio 
diversification, the average monthly turnover of an investor (calculated as the average monthly 
trading value divided by the average value of the portfolio of the same investor over the month).  
For individual investors, who comprise the vast majority of our sample, we also include a dummy 
variable to indicate whether the investor is male or female and the age of the investor (a continuous 
variable capturing the number of years from the birth year to the current year for each individual 
investor and updated at the beginning of each year of the sample period).  We do not differentiate 
gender or age for the small number of institutional investors in the sample. 
We report the results of the regression analysis in Table 7.  To provide the broadest 
interpretation of the results possible, we use the full sample of investors rather than restricting our 
                                                 
21 For motivation, see Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), Gervais and Odean (2001), Feng and Seasholes (2005), Dhar 
and Zhu (2006), Chen et al (2007), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Nicolosi et al (2009) and Seru et al (2010), among others. 
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analysis to only those investors with both positive disposition effect or house money effect 
measures.  Across this sample, and including both institutional and individual investors, we find no 
evidence of an interaction between the disposition effect and the house money effect, which is in 
line with the correlation results reported in Table 6 based on the full sample of investors.  However, 
the dummy variable capturing investor type (individual or institutional) is significant in the model, 
thus we split the sample and look at individual investors only, as there are insufficient institutions in 
our sample.  For the model including all individual investors, but excluding institutions, we now find 
evidence of a negative interaction between the disposition effect and the house money effect.  The 
coefficient on the house money effect measure is negative and significant at 10% based on two-tail 
tests: the higher the house money effect measure, the lower the disposition effect measure.22  The 
negative coefficient on the house money effect measure indicates that it moderates the disposition 
effect.  Prior realized gains on an individual stock cause investors to be more risk seeking, thus 
decreasing the tendency of an investor to sell the stock in question when it is in the gain region.  In 
contrast, prior realized losses on an individual stock cause investors to be less risk seeking, thus 
decreasing the tendency of an investor to hold the stock when it is in the loss region.  If prospect 
theory, and therefore loss aversion, has a role to play in the disposition effect, this result casts doubt 
on the assertion in Frino et al. (2008, p.13-14, emphasis added) that loss aversion and the house 
money effect are “two separate and psychologically independent drivers of …. risk taking”.23 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
                                                 
22 We also conduct the analysis using the reduced sample of only those investors with positive disposition effect and house money 
effect measures.  The results, not reported here, are robust to this change, which has the added effect of improving the significance of 
the coefficient on the house money effect measure slightly.  While some control variables are significant in the models, thus attesting 
to the need to control for individual investor characteristics when investigating behavioral biases, we do not comment on them here 
for the sake of brevity.   
23 Feng and Seasholes (2005) highlight limitations associated with using the Odean (1998) methodology in cross-sectional analyses of 
individual investors, with PGRi-PLRi decreasing in the number of stocks in the investor’s portfolio.  Our results are robust to such 
concerns for two reasons.  First, the regression models include the average number of stocks investors hold as a control variable.  
While the negative and significant coefficient supports Feng and Seasholes (2005), the inclusion of the control variable removes its 
effect on the relationship between the measures of the disposition and house money effects.  Second, we also re-ran the regressions 
with PGRi/PLRi -1 as the dependent variable.  The results, not reported, were largely unchanged (though the institutional dummy 
was no longer significant), with a negative and significant coefficient on the house money effect measure for the whole sample. 
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In analysis similar to Odean (1998), though not reported here in the interest of brevity, we 
compute ex post, cumulative market-adjusted returns for the winners sold and the losers held over 
the next 12 months.  We find that the disposition effect is costly to investors, with winning stocks 
sold earning on average a 3.92% higher return than losing stocks held.  Extending Odean’s (1998) 
approach to consider the impact of the house money effect, we separate the ex post returns for 
winner and loser stocks into those stocks for which investors have positive and negative prior 
realized outcomes.  We find that winning stocks sold after a positive prior realized gain earn on average 
a 1.99% lower return than winners sold after a negative prior realized gain, thus the house money effect 
reduces the cost to investors succumbing to the tendency to sell winning stocks.  We find that losing 
stocks held after a positive prior realized gain earn on average a 0.43% lower return than losers held 
after a negative prior realized gains, thus the house money effect increases the cost to investors 
succumbing to the tendency to hold losing stocks.  The cost reduction of 1.99% for winning stocks 
is over four times the size of the cost increase of 0.43% for losing stocks, hence the analysis 
supports the view that the house money effect moderates the disposition effect and that the impact 
is of economic significance.  Rather than be detrimental to profit as is the conventional perception 
of investment biases, Frino et al. (2008, p.22) conjecture that such biases may increase profit by 
cancelling out or reducing the effect of opposing biases.  We provide direct evidence that this can 
indeed be the case. 
6. Conclusions 
Using investor-level data from China, we test for trading behavior consistent with the 
disposition and house money effects.  We report three new findings that clarify how prior outcomes 
influence trading behavior.  First, the two effects coexist contemporaneously in a single financial 
market and, intriguingly, the majority of investors (53.5%) succumb simultaneously to both effects.  
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Sales after a gain (i.e. winners) are lower after prior realized gains than after prior realized losses and 
sales after a loss (i.e. losers) are higher after prior realized losses than after prior realized gains, thus 
supporting Neilson’s (1998) claim that the disposition and house money effects could be reconciled 
by adding income to date to the S-shape value function of prospect theory. 
Second, it is important to distinguish prior outcomes across two dimensions; unrealized/realized 
and stock/portfolio level.  We find that the disposition effect is related to prior unrealized outcomes at 
the stock level and not observed at the portfolio level, while the house money effect is related to prior 
realized outcomes at the stock level and to prior unrealized and realized outcomes at the portfolio level.  
Thus, we extend the findings in Liu et al. (2010) and Massa and Simonov (2005), to show the house 
money effect is present at the stock level, not just the portfolio level. 
Third, we report an interaction between the disposition and house money effects.  Prior realized 
gains over an individual stock make investors more risk seeking than prior realized losses, when 
investors make sell versus hold decisions concerning the stock.  Relative to the situation with prior 
realized losses, prior realized gains on an individual stock decrease the tendency of an investor to sell 
the stock in question when it is in the gain region and increase the tendency of an investor to hold 
the stock when it is in the loss region.  We provide evidence that the house money effect moderates 
the disposition effect, making it less costly.  While conventional wisdom views cognitive biases as 
detrimental, this need not always be the case, particularly when multiple biases may be at play. 
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Table 1  
PGR and PLR for trades with prior realized gains and losses 
  All stocks 
Stocks with 
prior realized 
gains (G) 
Stocks with 
prior realized 
losses (L) 
Difference 
between (G) 
and (L) t-statistic 
Number of realized gains 35,725  10,893  3,851     
Number of paper gains 90,735  25,283  7,513     
PGR 0.2825  0.3011  0.3389  -0.0378 -7.474 *** 
Number of realized losses 39,206  5,060  16,458     
Number of paper losses 283,370  27,644  82,753     
PLR 0.1215  0.1547  0.1659  -0.0112 -4.809 *** 
PGR minus PLR 0.1610  0.1464  0.1730     
t-statistic 115.747 *** 46.724 *** 37.651 ***      
Note: This table reports the Percentage of Gains Realized (PGR) to the Percentage of Losses Realized (PLR) 
for all stocks, stocks with prior realized gains and stocks with prior realized losses (i.e. realized in the 
preceding one day to three months before the decision to sell or hold). The difference between G and L is the 
difference of PGR (or PLR) over stocks with prior realized gains and prior realized losses.  
 
*, **, and *** denote significant difference at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, standard errors calculated 
as per Odean (1998, p18). 
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Table 2  
Expected absolute position change risk proxy and prior outcomes 
    Wealth of investor   
   Quintile Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) ∆Q5-Q1  
Panel A: Observations are double sorted on wealth of investor and prior realized outcomes 
Rate of 
Realized 
Outcomes to 
Position 
Value 
Q1 0.256  0.249  0.253  0.221  0.229  3.198 *** 
Q2 0.287  0.271  0.274  0.253  0.257  5.079 *** 
Q3 0.305  0.318  0.287  0.297  0.280  3.010 *** 
Q4 0.329  0.318  0.311  0.310  0.321  0.557  
Q5 0.362  0.397  0.380  0.348  0.340  0.958  
 ∆Q5-Q1  12.927 *** 5.156 *** 11.511 *** 17.161 *** 4.363 ***    
  Factor  P-value   
Sig. of Two-way ANOVA 
test 
Prior realized outcomes  0.000 ***   
Wealth  0.000 ***   
Interaction  0.034 **   
Panel B: Observations are double sorted on wealth of investor and prior unrealized outcomes  
Rate of 
Unrealized 
Outcomes to 
Position 
Value 
Q1 0.267  0.236  0.237  0.219  0.217  10.683 *** 
Q2 0.278  0.272  0.266  0.247  0.243  7.354 *** 
Q3 0.290  0.292  0.284  0.274  0.268  4.274 *** 
Q4 0.313  0.315  0.305  0.292  0.289  4.270 *** 
Q5 0.373  0.412  0.359  0.328  0.311  2.676 *** 
 ∆Q5-Q1  10.156 *** 5.212 *** 10.950 *** 9.811 *** 4.940 ***    
  Factor  P-value  
Sig. of Two-way ANOVA 
test 
Prior unrealized outcomes  0.000 ***  
Wealth  0.001 ***  
 Interaction   0.000 ***   
Note: The table reports average risk measured by the expected absolute change of the investor’s position, 
double sorted by the wealth of investors and the rate of realized (unrealized) outcomes to position value in 
Panel A (Panel B). The ∆Q5-Q1 in row (column) gives the t-statistic of the difference of the risks between 
quintiles with highest wealth (prior outcome rate) and lowest wealth (prior outcome rate). The ANOVA test 
gives the significance of wealth effect, prior outcomes effect, and interaction.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3  
Relative trade size risk proxy and prior outcomes 
    Wealth of investor   
   Quintile Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) ∆Q5-Q1  
Panel A: Observations are double sorted on wealth of investor and prior realized outcomes 
Rate of 
Realized 
Outcomes to 
Position 
Value 
Q1 0.953  0.916  0.990  0.997  1.000  1.542  
Q2 0.908  0.966  0.926  0.936  0.954  1.360  
Q3 0.911  0.915  0.949  0.866  0.881  0.824  
Q4 0.906  0.960  0.926  0.983  0.876  0.859  
Q5 1.004  1.083  1.047  1.003  0.980  0.578  
 ∆Q5-Q1  2.354 ** 5.070 *** 1.659 * 0.142  0.357     
  Factor  P-value   
Sig. of Two-way ANOVA test Prior realized outcomes  0.000 ***   
Wealth  0.007 ***   
Interaction  0.000 ***   
Panel B: Observations are double sorted on wealth of investor and prior unrealized outcomes  
Rate of 
Unrealized 
Outcomes to 
Position 
Value 
Q1 0.922  0.919  0.884  0.944  0.862  1.819 * 
Q2 0.915  0.914  0.922  0.890  0.832  2.584 *** 
Q3 0.970  0.961  0.924  0.946  0.909  1.780 * 
Q4 0.915  0.977  0.994  0.991  0.910  0.174  
Q5 1.007  1.084  1.107  1.010  0.926  1.652 * 
 ∆Q5-Q1  3.433 *** 4.688 *** 5.877 *** 1.531  3.416 ***    
  Factor  P-value  
Sig. of Two-way ANOVA test Prior unrealized outcomes  0.000 ***  
Wealth  0.000 ***  
 Interaction   0.053 *   
Note: The table reports average risk measured by the relative trade size, double sorted by the wealth of 
investors and the rate of realized (unrealized) outcomes to position value in Panel A (Panel B). The ∆Q5-Q1 
difference in row (column) gives the t-statistic of the difference of the risks between quintiles with highest 
wealth (prior outcome rate) and lowest wealth (prior outcome rate). The ANOVA test gives the significance 
of wealth effect, prior outcomes effect, and interaction.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4  
Portfolio beta risk proxy and prior outcomes 
    Wealth of investor   
   Quintile Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (high) ∆Q5-Q1  
Panel A: Observations are double sorted on wealth of investor and prior realized outcomes 
Rate of Realized 
Outcomes to 
Position Value 
Q1 1.052  1.083  1.078  1.037  0.996  2.952 *** 
Q2 1.066  1.048  1.080  1.056  0.994  4.153  *** 
Q3 1.072  1.052  1.087  1.065  1.033  2.259 ** 
Q4 1.082  1.072  1.114  1.051  1.029  2.845 *** 
Q5 1.098  1.088  1.075  1.052  1.005  3.946 *** 
 ∆Q5-Q1  2.724 *** 0.273  0.193  0.707  0.331     
  Factor  P-value   
Sig. of Two-way ANOVA 
test 
Prior realized outcomes  0.040 **   
Wealth  0.000 ***   
Interaction  0.127    
Panel B: Observations are double sorted on wealth of investor and prior unrealized outcomes  
Rate of 
Unrealized 
Outcomes to 
Position Value 
Q1 1.075  1.056  1.081  1.048  1.006  3.866 *** 
Q2 1.074  1.081  1.113  1.069  1.041  2.168 ** 
Q3 1.063  1.073  1.093  1.066  1.030  1.801 * 
Q4 1.072  1.059  1.074  1.041  1.002  3.399 *** 
Q5 1.085  1.073  1.072  1.037  0.992  4.462 *** 
 ∆Q5-Q1  0.534  0.785  0.521  0.573  0.728     
  Factor  P-value  
Sig. of Two-way ANOVA 
test 
Prior unrealized outcomes  0.005 ***  
Wealth  0.000 ***  
 Interaction   0.757    
Note: The table reports average risk measured by portfolio beta, double sorted by the wealth of investors and 
the rate of realized (unrealized) outcomes to position value in Panel A (Panel B). The ∆Q5-Q1 in row 
(column) gives the t-statistic of the difference of the risks between quintiles with highest wealth (prior 
outcome rate) and lowest wealth (prior outcome rate). The ANOVA test gives the significance of wealth 
effect, prior outcomes effect, and interaction.  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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Table 5  
The impact of changes in prior outcomes on changes in risk attitude 
    Change of Unrealized Outcomes  
   >0 <0 
   
Relative 
trade size 
Portfolio 
CAPM beta 
Expected 
absolute 
position 
change 
Relative 
trade size 
Portfolio 
CAPM beta 
Expected 
absolute 
position 
change 
Change of 
Realized 
Outcomes 
>0 
0.018  0.014  0.030  -0.034  0.001  -0.010  
2.922 *** 1.759 * 5.524 *** -4.322 *** 0.163  -1.375  
<0 
0.016  -0.010  -0.010  -0.014  0.003  -0.032  
2.029 ** -2.024 ** -1.515  -1.883 * 0.692  -4.337 *** 
Note: This table reports how changes in prior outcomes for two continuous months impact on 
changes in risk attitude.  Observations are categorized into 2x2 groups by the sign of the change of 
unrealized outcomes and the sign of the change of realized outcomes. UO and RO are prior 
unrealized and realized outcomes. Risk attitudes are measured in three ways: relative trade size, 
portfolio beta, and expected absolute position change.  
t-statistics are reported in italics  and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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Table 6  
Distribution of scores and correlations between disposition effect and house money effect 
measures 
 
Panel A: Distribution of scores for the two measures 
  Disposition Effect  
  ≤0 >0 Sum 
    # investors Proportion # investors Proportion # investors Proportion 
House 
Money 
Effect  
≤0 37 4.90%  255 34.10%  292 39.00% *** 
>0 56 7.50%  400 53.50%  456 61.00% *** 
Sum 93 12.40% *** 655 87.60% ***      
Panel B: Correlation coefficients 
  Disposition Effect  
   Dummy All Obs. ≤0 >0   
House 
Money 
Effect  
Dummy -0.0002          
All Obs.   -0.017        
≤0     -0.038  -0.026    
>0       0.121  -0.137 ***   
Note: This table reports the distributions of scores for the disposition effect and house money effect 
measures (Panel A) and the correlation (Panel B) between them. For a given investor, for either 
measure, a value >0 indicates that they succumb to the effect and a value ≤0 indicates they do not.  
In Panel A, the z-test is computed to examine whether the proportion is significantly different from 
50%. For each effect, the dummy takes the value “1” when the measure is larger than 0. In Panel B, 
correlations coefficients are computed for all observations and for observations in the four (2x2) 
subgroups. The t-test is computed to examine whether the correlation coefficient is significantly 
different from 0.   
*** denotes significance at 1% level.  
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Table 7 
Multivariate relationship between the disposition effect and house money effect measures 
 
Dependent variable 
(Sample) 
 
Disposition effect 
(Full sample, n=748) 
Disposition effect 
(Individuals only, n=736) 
 Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Interception  0.1980 20.78 *** 0.2018 9.35 *** 
House money effect -0.0226 -1.62  -0.0243 -1.74 * 
Iinstitution -0.0230 -1.91 *    
Wealth  1.70E-09 0.49  -7.47E-09 -0.71  
Diversification  -0.0062 -4.07 *** -0.0075 -4.70 *** 
Turnover 0.0050 2.09 ** 0.0100 1.95 * 
Gender    0.0020 0.16  
Age    0.0030 8.35 *** 
Note: This table reports the results of regressions for which the dependent variable is the disposition 
effect measure, with the house money effect measure included as an explanatory variable. Control 
variables are included to account for differences in investor characteristics. Institution is a dummy 
variable which takes the value “1” when the given investor is an institutional investor. Wealth is the 
average monthly position value of the investor. Diversification is the average number of different 
stocks in the portfolio. Turnover is the monthly turnover, calculated as the average monthly trading 
value divided by the average position value. Gender is a dummy taking the value “1” when the 
investor is male. Age is the investor age in years. 
 *, **, and *** denote two-tail significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
